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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
Jamar Boykins appeals the grant of summary judgment for his employer, the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”), on his claims of race 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. We will affirm. 
I. 
Jamar Boykins, who is African American, currently serves as a first-class 
electrician in the Bridges & Building Department of SEPTA’s Railroad Division. 
Between 2013 and 2015, Boykins applied for a number of promotions to the position of 
maintenance manager. This case arises out of SEPTA’s decision to hire an alternative 
Caucasian candidate, James Schneider, for Maintenance Manager Position #14-110 and 
SEPTA’s failure to interview Boykins for Maintenance Manager Positions #14-260 and 
#15-071.  
When selecting candidates for vacant positions, SEPTA follows the procedures 
established in its Employment, Hiring, Promotion and Transfer Procedures Manual. As 
relevant here, prior to interviews, the manager seeking to have the job filled (the “Hiring 
Manager”) and a member of the Human Resources Department prepare a list of questions 
for candidates, as well as recommended responses. Interviews are then conducted by a 
panel of two to five interviewers, who, according to the Manual, “should be diverse.” 
App. 359. Following an interview, interviewers complete an Employment Evaluation 
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Form, ranking applicants based on their qualifications and experience. The candidate 
with the highest combined rating is offered the position.   
Boykins applied for Position #14-110 and, along with eleven other candidates, was 
interviewed on September 11, 2014, by three Caucasian panel members: Gerald 
McGovern (the Hiring Manager and, at all times relevant to this appeal, the Assistant 
Director of the Maintenance Department), Melissa Cooper, and Mark Nichols. Upon 
completion of the interviews, Boykins ranked seventh of the eleven candidates. James 
Schneider ranked first and was awarded the position. Thereafter, Boykins filed a 
complaint of discrimination—first with SEPTA’s Equal Employment Opportunity / 
Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) Office and later with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission—alleging he was not promoted because of his race. After receiving 
Boykins’s complaint, Lorraine McKenzie, Director of the EEO/AA Office, sent a 
memorandum to the Director of Maintenance for the Railroad Division (William Dilks) 
and other senior employees informing them of the allegations. 
Boykins continued to apply for various maintenance manager positions after filing 
his complaint, including Positions #14-260 and #15-071.1 (Boykins also applied for 
Position #15-063 and was selected for an interview but declined to attend.) When SEPTA 
failed to offer him an interview for either position, Boykins amended his discrimination 
                                              
1 McGovern was the Hiring manager for Position #15-071 and Stephen Kish was the 
Hiring Manager for Position #14-260.  
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complaint to include a claim of retaliation. Boykins also alleged other incidents of 
retaliation including: a confrontation with Andy Gillespie, Chief Engineer of the 
Engineering, Maintenance and Construction Department, in which Gillespie allegedly 
verbally and physically assaulted Boykins (by touching his cheek) after allegedly falsely 
accusing him of being at Queen Lane Station; an incident with McGovern in which 
McGovern “got real hostile with [Boykins] as he proceeded to tell [Boykins] to go put 
[his] vest on,” App. 153; and McGovern’s failure to grant Boykins’s requests to receive 
NORAC training.2   
II.3 
A. 
Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) prohibit an 
employer from engaging in race discrimination against an employee. See 42 U.S.C. 
                                              
2 NORAC stands for Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee, a committee 
formed by various railroads to establish common rules for the operation of the railroads.  
3 The Magistrate Judge had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(1), 1331, and 1367 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the Magistrate Judge’s 
grant of summary judgement is plenary, see Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013), and we apply the same standard as the trial judge, 
reviewing the record and making all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor, see 
Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005). “We will affirm if 
our review shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 
288, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A dispute is genuine “only if 
there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-
moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the 
suit under governing law.” Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006). 
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party 
fails “to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to 




§§ 2000e-2, et seq.; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951, et seq. Title VII racial discrimination 
claims are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework established in 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). We have applied 
this framework to PHRA claims. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 
409 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he standards are the same for purposes of determining [a] 
summary judgment motion.”); see also Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 
1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995).  
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he is a member of a protected 
class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was either not hired or was fired from 
that position; and (4) nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably. See 
Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318-19 (3d Cir. 2000). Once the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to 
articulate “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.” 
Id. at 319 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 
(2000)). If the defendant is able to articulate such a reason, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff, who must demonstrate “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination 
was the real reason.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)). To avoid 
summary judgment in the employer’s favor, the plaintiff must point to some evidence 
“from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated 
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legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id. at 764.  
To discredit an employer’s articulated reason for the adverse employment action, a 
plaintiff must “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its 
action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and 
hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Id. 
at 765 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (brackets 
omitted). The burden on a plaintiff is “difficult,” id., but as we have explained, “[i]t arises 
from an inherent tension between the goal of all discrimination law and our society’s 
commitment to free decisionmaking by the private sector in economic affairs,” Ezold v. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992).  
To show that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a cause 
for the employer’s action, “the plaintiff must point to evidence with sufficient probative 
force that a factfinder could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [race] was 
a motivating or determinative factor in the employment decision.” Simpson v. Kay 
Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1998). Examples include 
showing that the employer has previously discriminated against the plaintiff, that the 
employer has discriminated against members of the plaintiff’s protected class or another 
protected class, or that similarly situated people not within plaintiff’s class were treated 





We first consider Boykins’s argument that he produced sufficient evidence of 
pretext to discredit SEPTA’s proffered reason for not promoting him to Maintenance 
Manager Position #14-110: that he was not the most qualified candidate. Boykins 
contends he can establish pretext through (1) “inconsistencies” in SEPTA’s proffered 
reason for promoting Schneider to Position #14-110, Appellant’s Br. at 22; (2) 
McGovern’s “persistent[]” violations of SEPTA’s policies and procedures, id. at 23; and 
(3) SEPTA’s “past and subsequent” discrimination, id. at 28-31. This argument is 
unsupported and belies the evidentiary record. Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment on Boykins’s claim of race discrimination. 
First, Boykins argues that SEPTA’s reference to Position #14-110 as 
“construction-related” and its statement that he did not have sufficient “construction-
related” experience is a “new found reason for awarding Schneider” Position #14-110. Id. 
at 22. This reason, Boykins contends, is inconsistent with the posted job description and 
SEPTA’s January 2015 response to his EEOC complaint—which do not describe the 
position as construction-related—and, accordingly, is sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could disbelieve SEPTA’s reasons for not promoting him.  
Boykins raises these “inconsistencies” for the first time on appeal and, as such, 
this argument is waived. See, e.g., Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 
2011). Regardless, a review of the record reveals no inconsistencies, and the value 
SEPTA placed on Schneider’s construction experience can hardly be characterized as 
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“new found”.4 Where the employer asserts it hired the “best qualified” candidate, a 
plaintiff must show “that the defendant’s selection process and criteria were filled with 
such inconsistencies that the employer’s claim that it was seeking the ‘best qualified’ 
candidate was a sham.” Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 999 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). Boykins cannot make such a showing here, primarily because he can point 
to no actual inconsistencies. 
Boykins next contends McGovern’s violations of SEPTA’s policies and 
procedures demonstrate sufficient evidence of pretext to avoid summary judgment. 
Specifically, Boykins refers to McGovern interviewing applicants who did not meet the 
minimum qualification requirements; constituting an all-white interview panel for a 
position with a minority affirmative action goal,” Appellant’s Br. at 24; and “using his 
own subjective and prejudicial decision in weighing the responses of the candidates to 
each question,” id. We find this argument similarly unpersuasive. 
                                              
4 As the trial judge noted, “[t]he first of the 10 interview questions asked of all applicants 
reflected that construction experience would be a major consideration in selecting a 
candidate for the position.” Boykins v. SEPTA, No. CV 16-985, 2017 WL 1355036, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2017). Furthermore, contrary to Boykins’s assertion that the job 
posting does not “mention ‘construction,’” Appellant’s Br. at 22, the posting describes 
primary responsibilities as “[a]ssist[] engineering in various design changes in an effort to 
improve infrastructure,” App. 237, and “[s]upervise force account construction projects,” 
id. (emphasis added). In addition, SEPTA’s response to Boykins’s EEOC complaint 
explains how Schneider’s construction experience will be useful to Position #14-110, 
particularly because Schneider formerly operated his own construction business. The 
response states “Mr. Schneider was the owner and operator of his own construction 
business . . . [where] he was responsible for not only the day-to-day construction and 
design functions but also a wide array of other duties including supervising employees 
and contractors as well as managing billing and payroll.” App. 782.  
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As an initial matter, there is an inherent difficulty in attributing discriminatory 
intent to SEPTA based on the failure of one member of a three-member interview panel 
to follow SEPTA’s policies and procedures. While McGovern was the Hiring Manager 
for the position, as described above, SEPTA’s hiring procedures require each interviewer 
to complete an Employment Evaluation Form, ranking all applicants interviewed. At the 
conclusion of the interviews, individual panel members’ rankings are combined by the 
Hiring Manager and the candidate with the highest combined rating is offered the 
position. Boykins has not alleged that the two other panel members were motivated by 
discriminatory animus. And, even if McGovern had ranked Boykins first instead of fifth, 
Boykins would not have been awarded the position.5 
Furthermore, “[w]e have applied the principles explained in Fuentes to require 
plaintiffs to present evidence contradicting the core facts put forward by the employer as 
the legitimate reason for its decision.” Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d 
Cir. 2005). SEPTA’s asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reason is that Schneider was 
the most qualified candidate for the position. Boykins does not explain how McGovern’s 
decision to interview the majority of people from the Building & Bridges Department 
who applied for Position #14-110 or assemble an “all-white interview panel” contradicts 
or casts doubt on this reason.  
                                              
5 The individual Employment Evaluation Forms show McGovern ranked Boykins fifth 
overall, Cooper ranked Boykins tenth overall, and Nichols ranked Boykins seventh 
overall. Based on the rankings of the eleven other individuals interviewed, if McGovern 
had ranked Boykins first and other candidates’ scores were adjusted accordingly, five 
candidates would still have had higher combined ratings. 
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Regarding McGovern’s decision to interview unqualified applicants, we agree 
with the trial judge’s reasoning. “Given that Boykins was offered an interview and that 
. . . the applicant chosen was qualified and was rated the highest by all three panel 
members, the fact that McGovern chose to grant interviews to additional candidates who 
were not qualified does not logically create any inference of discriminatory motive.” 
Boykins, 2017 WL 1355036, at *5 (internal citation omitted).  
We also agree with the trial judge’s finding that SEPTA’s policies do not 
articulate a definitive requirement for a diverse interview panel.6 But even if SEPTA’s 
policies and procedures did create such a requirement, the mere fact that McGovern did 
not follow this requirement, without more, is not sufficient evidence to allow a 
reasonable factfinder to find pretext. “Although the race and/or gender of the 
individual(s) responsible for a hiring decision is certainly relevant, it is insufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination without more.” Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 
                                              
6 Boykins argues the trial judge looked at the evidence in the light most favorable to 
SEPTA, the moving party, in making this determination. While the trial judge must 
“credit all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Appellant’s Br. at 27, “[t]he 
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be 
insufficient [to defeat summary judgment]; there must be evidence on which the jury 
could reasonably find for the plaintiff,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
252 (1986). In support of a definitive requirement for a diverse panel (where the position 
has an affirmative action goal), Boykins points to language in SEPTA’s policies stating 
“[t]he Hiring Manager in conjunction with the Human Resources Recruiter must select 
appropriate Panel Members. Panel Members should be diverse,” App. 359, and argues 
neither O’Neal’s, nor any other SEPTA official’s affidavits, claim SEPTA does not have 
such a definitive requirement. We find the language Boykins highlights suggests an 
aspirational goal and not a definitive requirement. More importantly, it is not enough for 
Boykins to merely rely on affidavits which fail to disclaim such a requirement exists to 
create a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.  
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F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1999). Boykins points to nothing more evidencing discrimination 
in the record.  
Lastly, Boykins contends a reasonable factfinder could discredit the scores 
awarded to Schneider because McGovern used his own “subjective and prejudicial 
decision in weighing the responses of the candidates to each question.” Appellant’s Br. at 
24. If true, this argument could undermine SEPTA’s assertion that Schneider was the 
most qualified candidate. But Boykins can point to no evidence in the record suggesting 
McGovern’s scoring was influenced by prejudice and “belief alone is insufficient to raise 
an issue of material fact.” Bray, 110 F.3d at 996.7 If anything, the record contradicts the 
discriminatory motives Boykins attributes to McGovern. Of the panel members, 
McGovern gave Boykins the highest ranking he received. McGovern was also the Hiring 
Manager for Position #15-071 (which Boykins also applied for) and, in that instance, 
SEPTA selected an African American for the promotion. 
Boykins’s final argument that he produced sufficient evidence of pretext is based 
on allegations of SEPTA’s past discriminatory conduct. Boykins alleges that no African 
Americans have been hired as maintenance managers in twenty years in the Building & 
Bridges Department and emphasizes all maintenance managers in his department prior to 
January 1, 2015, were Caucasian. This, Boykins argues, “is circumstantial evidence from 
                                              
7 As noted by the trial judge, Boykins also fails to “explain how an interviewer could 
assign a numeric score to a candidate’s response based on the suggested answer without 
applying some subjective judgment.” Boykins, 2017 WL 1355036, at *6. 
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which a reasonable jury could consider in determining the motive, intent, and culture in 
this department at SEPTA.” Appellant’s Br. at 31.   
“Statistical evidence of an employer’s pattern and practice with respect to minority 
employment may be relevant to a showing of pretext.” Ezold, 983 F.2d at 542. But first, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate the statistical significance of the data. See Keller v. Orix 
Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1112 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Berger v. Iron Workers 
Reinforced Rodmen, 843 F.2d 1395, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“It is well established that if 
a statistical model does not take into account the legitimate, objective qualifications for 
the jobs being analyzed, then it fails sufficiently to focus on an appropriate labor pool.”).  
Here, Boykins does not provide a basis for his statement that no African 
Americans have been hired as maintenance managers in twenty years in the Building & 
Bridges Department. Furthermore, while the record supports Boykins’s contention that 
the four maintenance managers reporting to McGovern were Caucasian, the trial judge 
explained that “the race of prior persons promoted is meaningless without evidence 
regarding whether African-American applicants were denied the promotion or the relative 
qualifications of the applicants.” Boykins, 2017 WL 1355036, at *5. There is nothing in 
the record which could allow a reasonable factfinder to draw an inference of 
discrimination from the bare assertion Boykins presents. Moreover, Boykins asks us to 
look at the “totality of the circumstances” and SEPTA’s corporate culture, Appellant’s 
Br. at 29, but as the trial judge emphasized, “the evidence is unchallenged that as of 
January 2015, the overall distribution of minorities among management throughout 
SEPTA was 41%,” Boykins, 2017 WL 1355036, at *5 n. 3.   
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Because Boykins has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable 
factfinder to find pretext, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment on Boykins’s 
discrimination claim for SEPTA’s failure to award him Position #14-110.8  
IV. 
A. 
                                              
8 Boykins also raises a racial discrimination claim for SEPTA’s decision not to interview 
him for Maintenance Manager Position #14-260. Boykins raises this as an independent 
claim for the first time on appeal. (Previously, Boykins has characterized SEPTA’s 
decision not to interview him for this position as evidence of pretext—to rebut SEPTA’s 
proffered reason for not promoting him to Position #14-110—and retaliation.) Generally, 
“arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to be waived and 
consequently are not susceptible to review . . . absent exceptional circumstances.” United 
States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  
 
Even if we were to consider this argument, however, “courts have regularly held that the 
plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination unless he or she proves that 
the employer knew about the plaintiff’s particular personal characteristic.” Geraci v. 
Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996). We have explained that a 
plaintiff must establish “some causal nexus” between his membership in a protected class 
and the adverse employment action, Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d 
Cir. 2003), and we will not “presume that an employer most likely practiced unlawful 
discrimination when it did not know that the plaintiff even belonged to the protected 
class,” Geraci, 82 F.3d at 581. 
 
Boykins contends he was qualified for Position #14-260, which rebuts SEPTA’s asserted 
non-discriminatory reason that he was denied an interview because he lacked relevant 
experience. But, Boykins fails to refute SEPTA’s argument that the individuals 
participating in the interview selection process, Cabiness, O’Neal, and Kish, did not 
know his race when denying him an interview. Cabiness stated in her deposition she did 
not know Boykins’s race, and O’Neal and Kish stated this in affidavits. In his Opposition 
to SEPTA’s Motion for Summary Judgment before the trial court, Boykins argued that 
Kish’s statement is false because Kish interviewed him on June 5, 2014, for a previous 
maintenance manager position and therefore knew his race. Boykins does not raise this 
argument on appeal. Thus, Boykins failed to establish a prima facie case of 




Title VII and the PHRA also protect employees who attempt to exercise the rights 
guaranteed by their respective provisions against retaliation by employers. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–3(a); 43 Pa. Stat. § 955(d). In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, we 
consider retaliation claims for both statutes under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
See, e.g., Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Under McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation a plaintiff 
must show: (1) he or she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer 
took an adverse employment action either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s 
protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity 
and the employer’s adverse action. See Marra v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 
300 (3d Cir. 2007). As before, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the employer to present a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken the 
adverse action. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 
2015). If the employer advances such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that “the employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was 
the real reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (quoting Marra, 497 F.3d at 300).  
Protected activities include making formal charges of discrimination against an 
employer. See id. Furthermore, “a plaintiff need not prove the merits of the underlying 
discrimination complaint, but only that ‘he was acting under a good faith, reasonable 
belief that a violation existed.’” Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 




To qualify as an adverse employment action, an employer’s retaliatory conduct 
must be such that it “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 
(2006)). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the protected activity “was a but-for 
cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer,” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013), to establish the third element of the prima face 
case. 
B. 
 Boykins alleges he was subjected to the following retaliatory acts following his 
complaints of discrimination: he was denied interviews for Maintenance Manager 
Positions #14-260 and #15-071; in October 2014, SEPTA’s Chief Engineer of the 
Engineering, Maintenance and Construction Department, Andy Gillespie, yelled at him 
and pointed his finger in his face; McGovern’s “harassment in May 2015”; and 
McGovern’s failure to grant Boykins’s requests to receive NORAC training. Because we 
find Boykins cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation on any of these grounds, 
we will affirm the grant of summary judgment.  
We first address Boykins’s retaliatory failure to interview claims. A plaintiff 
“cannot establish that there was a causal connection without some evidence that the 
individuals responsible for the adverse action knew of the plaintiff’s protected conduct at 
the time they acted.” Daniels, 776 F.3d at 196; see also Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 
650 (3d Cir. 2007). Boykins contends there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to 
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support his claim that the decision makers denying him interviews for positions #14-260 
and #15-071 knew of his EEOC complaint.9 The trial judge correctly rejected this 
contention.  
In support of his claim, Boykins speculates SEPTA could not have provided 
responses to his EEOC complaint without informing McGovern. He also points to a 
memo the Director of the EEO/AA, Employee Relations Department sent to the Director 
of the Maintenance Department (McGovern’s supervisor) and separately argues that 
because the determination of selecting applicants for an interview takes place during a 
screening meeting between SEPTA’s Human Resources Recruiter (a member of 
SEPTA’s EEO/AA Department) and the Hiring Manager, and because there is no 
transcript of what is discussed at these screening meetings, “the Court cannot take as 
gospel truth Mr. Kish’s and Mr. McGovern’s statements that they were not aware of 
Plaintiff’s complaint.” Appellant’s Br. at 46.  
  “Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false 
issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment.” Lexington Ins. 
Co. v. W. Pennsylvania Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 333 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Hedberg v. 
Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995)). Thus Boykins’s 
                                              
9 Boykins also alleges the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment was based on the 
erroneous proposition that he was required to present direct evidence of their knowledge. 
This contention is devoid of any support in the record, which in fact demonstrates that the 
trial judge considered the evidence Boykins submitted (including the memo the Director 
of the EEO/AA, Employee Relations Department sent to the Director of the Maintenance 
Department Boykins points to here) but found it too speculative to raise a genuine issue.   
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unsupported inference that his departmental managers were notified in October 2014, 
contrary to their testimony and merely because their supervisors were notified, is not 
sufficient to defeat SEPTA’s motion for summary judgment.10  
Furthermore, regarding Kish’s and McGovern’s statements that they were not 
aware of his complaint, “the plaintiff may not respond simply with general attacks upon 
the defendant’s credibility, but rather must identify affirmative evidence from which a 
jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of proving the pertinent 
motive.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998). Boykins has not done so 
here.11 Accordingly, we find Boykins cannot demonstrate that he would have been 
                                              
10 This is particularly true given the emphasis placed on “[c]onfidentiality and 
prohibitions of retaliation[]” in SEPTA’s Internal Discrimination Compliant Procedure. 
App. 882. Additionally, as SEPTA explains in its brief, the drafter of the EEOC response 
testified that in preparing the response he had spoken to the recruiter, John Broughton, 
and Broughton’s supervisor, Dan DiAndrea. See Appellee’s Br. at 44.  
11 Boykins alleges that in April 2015, “Mr. Wharton told him that Mr. McGovern said 
[Boykins was denied training] because [he] had gone to the EEOC to file compliant 
against SEPTA.” Appellant’s Br. at 51. While Boykins asserts this in reference to 
SEPTA’s failure to provide him NORAC training, if true, this fact would suggest 
McGovern had knowledge of Boykins’s EEOC compliant when denying him an 
interview for Position #15-071. But a reasonable factfinder could not consider this 
statement, supported only by an affidavit filed by Boykins two months after his 
deposition, to create a genuine issue of material fact as to McGovern’s knowledge of 
Boykins’s discrimination complaint.    
We may disregard affidavits that contradict the record or materially alter the story told by 
discovery. See Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007). 
“When a party does not explain the contradiction between [a] subsequent affidavit and [a] 
prior deposition, the alleged factual issue in dispute can be perceived as a ‘sham,’ thereby 
not creating an impediment to a grant of summary judgment.” Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 
609, 624 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, Boykins’s contention that Wharton told him he was denied 
training because of his EEOC complaint contradicts Boykins’s earlier deposition 
testimony and responses to SEPTA’s interrogatories, both of which describe the 
converse: Boykins making this statement to Wharton. For example, Boykins’s response 
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granted an interview but for the fact that he filed his discrimination complaint and affirm 
the trial judge’s decision that Boykins cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation on 
this ground.12 
 Turning to Boykins’s claim of retaliatory harassment based on his interactions 
with Gillespie in October 2014 and McGovern in May 2015, we also affirm the trial 
judge’s determination that Boykins cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation on 
these grounds. As an initial matter, we have declined to find adverse action where the 
“alleged retaliatory acts were criticism, false accusations or verbal reprimands.” Brennan 
v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003). Boykins stresses, and SEPTA concedes, that 
Gillespie was mistaken in his confrontation with Boykins. In addition, even if McGovern 
had been hostile with Boykins and yelled at him, isolated and verbal reprimands do not 
constitute adverse action. “An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior 
                                              
to interrogatory 3 states, “Plaintiff said that he believe that their [sic] doing this because 
of the EEOC Claim he put in. Mr. Warton said he was going to email them again.” App. 
314 (emphasis added). During his deposition, Boykins stated “And I said I know why 
they’re doing this, they’re doing this because of my racial discrimination claim that I put 
in.” App. 147 (emphasis added). Boykins’s Statement of Disputed Material Facts further 
states “Mr. Wharton states he did not remember exactly what Mr. McGovern said in 
response to plaintiff’s request to take the NORAC classes.” App. 470. While a party may 
introduce “new evidence [that] may furnish a good faith basis for the inconsistency,” 
Baer, 392 F.3d at 626, Boykins has failed to either explain this inconsistency or introduce 
testimony of Wharton supporting his contention.  
12 Boykins challenges the trial judge’s determination that, even if Boykins could establish 
that McGovern and Kish knew he had filed a discrimination charge, Boykins was not 
qualified for either position and was therefore unable to establish pretext. In light of our 
finding that Boykins cannot establish either McGovern’s or Kish’s knowledge of the 
complaint, we need not reach this issue.   
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cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often 
take place at work and that all employees experience.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.  
Moreover, Boykins cannot show that these exchanges would not have occurred but 
for the fact Boykins filed his EEOC complaint. Again, Boykins emphasizes that Gillespie 
mistook him for someone else when he allegedly verbally and physically assaulted 
Boykins. This cuts against Boykins’s contention that Gillespie confronted him because of 
his racial discrimination allegations. Regarding McGovern, as we explained above, 
Boykins cannot demonstrate that McGovern was aware of his complaint in May 2015 or 
point to any evidence in the record casting doubt on McGovern’s statement that he only 
became aware of Boykins’s discrimination allegations in late 2016.13  
Boykins also makes a passing, but undeveloped, reference to Jensen v. Potter, in 
which we held that the retaliation provision of Title VII “can be offended by harassment 
that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.” 435 F.3d 444, 
449 (3d Cir. 2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 53. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, a retaliation claim lies 
where any activity of the employer—including harassment sufficient to create a hostile 
                                              
13 Boykins also accuses McGovern of “manipulating the promotional process by 
changing the qualification requirements for a maintenance manager position to preclude 
[him] from being interviewed.” Appellant’s Br. at 44-45. This allegation is supported 
only with hearsay evidence, which can only be considered on summary judgment if the 
party presenting it explains how it will present the evidence at trial in an admissible form. 
See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 
2016). As the trial judge noted, Boykins has not attempted such an explanation. 
Furthermore, the Cabiness deposition testimony Boykins cites does not support his claim 
that McGovern changed the job description for this position.  
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work environment—“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.” 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). However, “[a] skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an 
assertion, does not preserve a claim. Especially not when the brief presents a passel of 
other arguments.” United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 216 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Having made no attempt to demonstrate how the conduct he alleges amounts to a 
hostile work environment, Boykins has waived any retaliation claim premised on this 
ground. Moreover, this claim would suffer from the same causational defects discussed 
above.  
 We finally address Boykins’s claim that he was denied NORAC training in 
retaliation for his EEOC complaint. The denial of training can constitute retaliation where 
the training “contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement.” 
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (theorizing that “excluding an employee from a weekly 
training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement 
might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination”). But 
where a plaintiff cannot show that the training is germane to his regular job functions, we 
have found no basis for inferring the denial of training was discriminatory. See, e.g., 
Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 2000). For example, in Shaner, we 
emphasized in the context of a discrimination claim under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) that “[t]he company contends that PC applications and Excel 
were not necessary for Shaner to perform his job. Shaner’s testimony fails to counter the 
company’s contention, and indeed tends to support it . . . . [H]e gave no testimony 
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indicating that training in these areas was germane to his regular job functions.” Id. We 
thus affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff on his 
ADA claim premised on denial of training. Id. 
The situation is analogous here. McGovern testified that within the Bridges & 
Building Department, electricians are not required to have NORAC certification. He also 
testified that positions in NORAC training sessions are limited and preference is given to 
employees whose positions required this certification.  
Furthermore, we agree with the trial judge that Boykins cannot establish that 
obtaining NORAC certification would have significantly advanced his career. The record 
shows only one position he applied for required a NORAC certification—Position #15-
071-EMC—and Boykins was not otherwise qualified for that position. Notably, 
maintenance managers in the Bridges & Buildings Department are not required to have 
NORAC certifications. Accordingly, we find Boykins cannot adduce sufficient evidence 
to allow a reasonable factfinder to find pretext and affirm summary judgment on 
Boykins’s retaliation claims. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment to 
SEPTA.   
